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Abstract 
 
I investigate the tax sensitivity of European public companies’ capital structure decisions to corporate 
tax changes made in their home country. The research covers all the tax changes made inside the current 
28 member states during the 1980-2016 period. The research is made by using difference-in-difference 
model which compares the firms affected by tax change to other control groups with no tax changes. 
Within two years, companies lower their leverage on average by 45 basis points in case of tax decrease. 
Contrary to trade-off theory, long-term leverage seems to response only to tax cuts, not increases. In 
addition to the full sample of all firms, I also test the tax responsiveness of different control groups based 
on the, distress levels, location of sales, profitability and dividend payout. The tax sensitivity is greatest 
among profitable firms and firms with only domestic sales.  
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1. Introduction  
 
This paper examines the tax sensitivity of European public companies’ capital structure decisions to the 
corporate tax rate changes in EU member countries. I’m studying whether the firms respond to the tax cuts or 
increases by changing their capital structure and whether the corporations consider the tax benefit of debt in 
their capital structure decisions.  The research is based on the same approach as Heider & Ljungqvist (2012) 
used in their research which was able to identify that companies do consider taxes as a first-order determinant 
of firms’ capital structure choices in U.S.  
 
The contribution of this paper is to empirically prove that firms do reflect on the tax changes of nominal tax 
rates. The experiment is done by using difference-in-difference method. The approach aims to find causal 
understanding of firms’ capital structure decisions by comparing firms in countries with no tax changes to 
companies which are effected by a tax change and examines whether there are differences in the changes of 
their leverage ratio.  I find out that companies increase their amount of debt as the rate of taxation rises in their 
home country.  
 
The results are economically significant. The estimation shows that during the period 1980-2016 the firms 
inside EU-area decrease their long-term leverage on average by 0.22% percentage points in the same year and 
0.23% before the tax cut.  
 
The empirical results do not correspond according to the theoretical basis of capital structure decision (e.g. 
Modigliani & Miller, 1963) as the response on leverage to tax rate changes should be reciprocal. On contrary 
to the research of Heider & Ljungqvist (2012), European corporations responded only to tax cuts. Tax 
sensitivity is asymmetric and if the taxes increase firms do not respond by rising their leverage ratios. The 
results are strongest among highly profitable firms and for companies with only domestic sales.   
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2. Research question and hypothesis 
 
The research question of this paper is, whether the public firms in Europe change their leverage ratios in 
relation to the corporate tax changes. The theoretical basis of this problem is classical. The cornerstone of the 
value of debt is from 1958 when Modigliani & Miller published the theorem of the value of levered firm. 
According to the theory the value of the firm is defined by combining the value of the equity with the value of 
tax shields. The tax shield consists of the product of tax rate and the value of debt 
 
A slightly more recent publish, the trade-off theory states that companies choose how much to use debt and 
equity finance by balancing the costs and benefits (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). The two trade-offs are the 
tax shield benefit of leverage for the firm in contrast to the cost of financial distress. The financial distress 
costs consist of bankruptcy costs caused by the debt level and indirect costs like leaving staff and unfavorable 
payment terms. The tax shield value grows linearly whereas the costs of distress are convex and increase 
rapidly as certain level of leverage is reached. Figure 1a illustrates the total market value of firm with different 
debt levels. The optimal level of debt is reached when further increasing of debt increases the marginal cost of 
distress equally compared to the marginal benefit of tax shields. 
 
In figure 1b is illustrated the ideal experiment on randomly assigned different tax rates to firms and then 
compared their leverage to see whether different tax rates lead to different debt policies. The ideal experiment 
though is not possible because there is always some unobserved firm-level heterogeneity.  The marginal benefit 
of tax shield is not the same for every corporation; this is demonstrated in figure 1c. Even with the same 
nominal tax rate, effective tax rate differs depending e.g. if the firm has deferred tax assets from previous 
years’ losses. Similarly, a high-profit firm pays relatively more taxes compared to firms with smaller income. 
The higher the effective tax rate is, the larger the tax benefit of debt is for the firm but the high profitability 
also makes the borrowing easier when the company may get loans with better terms from financial institutions. 
 
It is challenging to identify whether the increased borrowing for high-profit firms are due to the more valuable 
tax shields or lower marginal cost of debt. Figure 1d visualize the case if there’s no impact on leverage in 
occasion of tax rate changes. If the null hypothesis of no sensitivity would be wrongly rejected the observed 
change in leverage is caused by variances in marginal cost of debt. This problem is designed to overcome in 
this experiment as the diff-in-diff method takes industry and country-specific developments into account. This 
means that the industry-shocks and firm-heterogeneity will be taken into account and their effect are removed 
from the results (Heider & Ljungqvist, 2012).   
 
In practice, firms do not reflect smoothly to the tax changes, because changing leverage ratios have remarkable 
costs. Companies may change their leverage ratios either by increasing their equity or by cutting down 
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borrowing. Obtaining new financing has always issuance costs, which consists from asymmetric information 
between the management and stakeholders as well as from transaction costs. The pecking order theory (Myers 
& Majluf, 1984) suggests that internal financing is the preferred way for the firm to finance its operations (no 
asymmetric information/transaction costs) followed by issuance of debt. The least favorable way to acquire 
financing is issuing new equity as it usually leads to a decrease in stock price.  
 
As the interest expenses are generally tax deductible from the corporations’ income in Europe, companies 
should react to the tax rate changes symmetrically. Lowering tax rates decreases the value of tax shields and 
makes equity more valuable with respect to debt. The hypothesis based on the theories is that companies should 
add the relative share of equity to debt in case of tax decrease. If the member states increase the taxation on 
companies, the firms are expected to increase their leverage to as the value of tax shields increases. The null 
hypothesis thus is that taxes do not have effect on leverage.   
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3. Data and methodology 
 
The research data was collected from four sources. For the firm-specific data, I used the data from Thompson 
Reuters Datastream which covers the data for all European public companies. The data for country-wide 
variables were collected from the OECD’s and The World Bank’s databases for all available years. The data 
is collected and reported in U.S. dollars to make the variables comparable through time.  
 
3.1 Firm-specific variables 
My sample consists of every member countries’ public companies reported in Thompson Reuters Datastream-
database during the years 1980-2016. To collect the data of firms from each country, I used constituents lists 
which include all available companies inside the observation period.  In total, there’s data for 15 855 firms in 
37 years. To avoid biased estimations, the sample also includes firms which do not exist in European stock 
exchange anymore but have been listed to some European Union’s member country’s stock exchange during 
the period. The data is collected from all available years for each member of the Union. For example, if the 
country became a member of European Union in 2004, the data is still collected from 1980 onwards. 
 
Dependent variable  
There are many various alternatives for the dependent variable. It’s possible to use total debt of company to 
define the company’s capital structure. However, the long-term leverage is likely to be more accurate estimate 
because short-term debt is strongly related to net working capital changes. Net working capital is typically 
non-interest bearing debt and seldom used for capital structure decisions. In the numerator of dependent 
variable thus is long term debt and in the denominator, the total assets of the firm. Because the book value of 
long-term debt cannot go over total assets by the definition, I exclude every observation which are greater than 
one and consider them as an error in data.  
 
Control variables  
The firm specific control variables needed for the research are total assets (Datastream code: WC02999), return 
on assets % (WC08326), price-to-book value ratio (PTBV), net tangible assets (NTA), total debt (WC03255) 
and long term leverage (WC03251). For dividend payout ratio (% earnings) I use Datastream item WC08256 
and for international sales item WC07101. 
 
I exclude all financial institutions with SIC = 6 (3952 firms, 31741 observations) and public-sector entities 
with SIC = 9 (13 firms, 16 observations). Financials are disregarded due to the very high leverage ratios and 
changing regulation during the period. Public-sector entities are not market value driven in same way as private 
companies, which is why they are omitted. Utility firms are also omitted from the data combining (419 firms, 
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1967 observations) because they require significant infrastructure and these firms often carry large amounts of 
debt and are highly sensitive to changes in the interest rates (e.g. Investopedia, 2017). Also, all the firms with 
negative or missing total assets are omitted from the research. 
 
The home country of the firm is assumed to be located according to the IBES-country codes. There are though 
surprisingly many missing observations (4187 out of 15888). Not to limit observations too much, if the IBES-
country code is missing from the data, I assume the stock to be from the country of the exchange. This may 
lead to few error estimations but it increases the amount of observations remarkably. The IBES-country code 
is static variable, and if a firm moves its HQ to another country during the observation period, it causes error 
estimations to the sample.   
 
I include a variable that measures the size of the firm to the regression, because large-cap firms tend to be able 
to have better borrowing conditions as their risk of default is considered to be lower. The firm-size is defined 
as the natural logarithm of total assets of the firm.  
 
The tangibility of assets is included to the regression as the bigger share of the firm’s assets are tangible, the 
more firm can offer deposits to guarantee borrowing. Tangibility is defined by the natural logarithm of net 
tangible assets. This omits every observation that is below zero. Also, if the value of net tangible assets rise 
above total assets, the observations are omitted from the sample. Another option is to create a year-specific 
rank variable of the net tangible assets in relation to total assets but it creates strong correlation between the 
dependent and explanatory variables as likewise the long-term leverage is divided by total assets. Either way, 
the tangibility item seems to have a sizable and significant negative impact on long-term leverage, which seems 
to be against the supposition.  The issue isn’t smoothened by cutting out the tales by 0.5% or/and using original 
values of assets in USD. Similarly using same kind of annual rank values for total assets and scaling them 
comparable with net tangible assets doesn’t change the overall picture.  
 
The leverage might change in response to changes in corporate growth opportunities (Faccio & Zu, 2011). For 
that reason, I include price-to-book ratio is included in the regression to estimate different investment 
opportunities for the firms and its affection to leverage. In total, there are 183565 observations with a mean of 
over 203.3. It’s clear that there are some outliers in the data which causes biases so I cut out half a per cent 
(915 observations) from the largest and smallest values. After the cut out, the average of the sample is 2.40.  
 
Without profits, there’s no tax benefit of debt. To estimate profitability, I use return on assets ratio.  The raw 
data of return on assets seem to have some biases as its arithmetic mean is -16.53. To rationalize this bias in 
data I also remove 0.5% of the observations from the tails. After the cutting the arithmetic mean of the sample 
is 2.79.  
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Financial distress costs 
Although the theoretical basis of trade-off theory has long been known, the financial distress costs for firms 
has been difficult to estimate empirically. Givoly, D. & Al. (1992) used Tobin’s Q ratio as a proxy for the 
distress costs for the firms during the Tax Reform Act in 1986. Altman (1968) introduced Z-score model to 
estimate the failure probability and distress costs for the firms. Another way to estimate distress costs would 
be the corporate bond yields and corporate credit ratings. The problem with European data is that as the capital 
markets are not as developed as in U.S. and there’s much less data available of bond yields. Either the credit 
rating industry is nowhere near the U.S. level in Europe so I must come up with some other proxy for distress 
costs. If I used only data with credit ratings/bond yields, it would limit the observations immoderately and it 
would lead to biases as the major of the firms with marketable corporate bonds are large-cap.  
 
There is no any proxy for replacement costs in datastream which is required for the Tobin’s Q ratio and every 
estimation of them are subjective guesses of the true replacement value. The Altman Z-score is the output of 
a credit-strength test that gauges a publicly traded manufacturing company's likelihood of bankruptcy. Initially 
introduced by Edward Altman (1968) the Z-score and has widely been used for distress cost estimations. A 
later study made by Agarwal & Taffler (2007) provides empirical evidence that Z-score has true failure 
prediction ability. Even if there are many restrictions using the z-score test Altman & Al. (2014) show in their 
study that for non-financials Z-score, the general model works reasonably well, for most countries, with 
prediction accuracy levels (AUC) of about 75%, and exceptionally well for some (above 90%).  
 
With this background, I choose to use the Altman’s Z-score model as the estimate for the distress costs. The 
Altman Z-score is based on five financial ratios that can be calculated straight from accounting data. It has a 
profitability, leverage, liquidity, solvency and activity measures to predict whether a company has a high 
degree of probability of being insolvent. High Z-score value indicates low distress costs. The formula of 
Altman’s Z-score is:  
 
Z-Score = 1.2A + 1.4B + 3.3C + 0.6D + 1.0E 
 
Where A = working capital / total assets, B = retained earnings / total assets, C = earnings before interest and 
tax / total assets, D = market value of equity / total liabilities, E = sales / total assets (Altman, 1968). 
 
3.2 Country-specific variables  
GDP growth and unemployment rates 
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The majority of country-specific variables are collected from OECD, but information is also collected from 
The World Bank if the nation is not a member of the organization. The country specific data consists of the 
annual real growth rates of gross domestic product and the unemployment percentage 
 
Corporate Tax Rates of Member States 
The data of corporation tax changes was gathered from two sources. For years 1980-2000 I used data from 
Trading Economics website. In time period of 2000-2016 I used tax data from OECD for the member countries. 
As Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Malta and Romania are not members of OECD, their data was entirely collected 
from Trading Economics. There is one variation between Trading Economics and OECD’s data, Latvia’s 
change between years1999-2000 are reported to decrease from 29% to 24% according to Trading Economics 
and from 29% to 25% according to OECD. In occasion of contradiction I chose to use data from OECD.  
 
Every country in European Union taxes its corporations. There has been a notable downward trend in the 
nominal corporate tax rates during 1980-2016 as the globalization has proceeded and the international tax 
competition between the nations has tighten. In 1980 the average nominal corporation tax rate was 48.6% (14 
observations) with maximum of 61.5%, whereas in 2016 the average tax rate was 22.4% with 28 observations 
with highest rate of 35%. In 2016, the country with lowest tax rate is Ireland with 12.5% nominal tax rate. 
  
The corporate tax rates used in the research are nominal after-interest rates. The tax rates include governmental 
corporate tax rates and possible sub-central corporate taxes. This assumption causes some noise to the data as 
the effective rate might differ, in some cases, significantly from the reported nominal tax rate. To provide 
context, Malta taxes companies at the standard rate of 35%. However, shareholders are entitled to a refund of 
part or of all the tax paid by the Malta company. Therefore, though corporate taxation in Malta is relatively 
high, the effective tax liability can decline to as low level as 5% of reported income (Malta Company Taxation, 
2017). Also, there are possible changes on personal capital gains or wage, sometimes countries compensate 
the corporate tax rate changes by changing taxation of individuals. This is an issue which increases the noise 
in the sample.  
 
Tax increases and decreases. 
Despite the descendent trend of taxes, there are 45 tax increases inside the time period of 1980-2016 inside the 
EU area. Estonia, Malta, Czech Republic, UK and Slovenia didn’t have any observations on tax increases.  17 
of the tax increases were made after 2000, 28 in 1980-1999. Increases have become a bit less frequent this 
millennium, but otherwise increases are distributed quite equally.  All the tax increases are listed in Appendix 
A.  Over the period 1980-2016, I recorded 174 tax decreases inside the EU-area. Malta was the only country 
that didn’t have any tax cuts. All the tax increases are listed in Appendix B. 
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3.3. Empirical strategy 
I examine the sensitivity of European public firms’ capital structure decisions from changes in member states’ 
corporate taxes by using a difference-in-difference regression approach. The method is based on the earlier 
study made by Heider & Ljungqvist in 2012.  
 
DDijct = bDT+ct-1 +gDT-ct-1 +dDXit-1 +qDZct-1 +ajt-1+eijct 
 
 
where i = index, j = firm, c = country and t = years. D is the first difference operator Dijct is a measure of 
leverage. Xit–1 and Zct–1 are firm- and country-level control variables, bDT+ct-1 +gDT-ct-1are the indicators if a 
country has increased or cut its tax rate and ajt-1= estimates the industry fixed effects. The coefficients b and 
g corresponds to the effect of tax changes on firms leverage. d and q capture the fixed effects for individual 
firms and country and a estimates the fixed effects to industry shocks. 
 
Since the research is made by difference-in-difference approach, the regression compares the fixed effects of 
the countries that increase their tax rate to the control groups, which consist of all the firms with no corporate 
tax rate changes at the same year inside the EU28-area. The regression takes all available tax rate changes into 
account inside the period of 1980-2016. It also allows covariates that vary at the firm- or state-level and over 
time. To measure both, the effect of tax cut and increase, there are two tax variables with coefficient to differ 
the impact of tax cuts and rises. This enables to identify asymmetric tax sensitivity of tax changes.  
 
For example, in 1985 there are two tax increases, one in Denmark, other in Greece and one tax decrease in 
United Kingdom. For those tax changes, I compare the affection of tax increases and tax cut to next year’s 
leverage in Denmark, Greece and UK against all the other EU-countries with no changes in corporate tax rate. 
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4. Empirical results 
4.1 Full sample 
The results for all European public companies are listed in table 2. It shows how firms react to the corporate 
income tax changes annually on average by changing their long-term leverage in years t= -2 to t = +2 for the 
firms facing tax change at year t = 0 and for group of companies not experiencing tax changes in their home 
country. The table reports the change in leverage using fixed-effect linear model, which uses the OLS estimator 
to remove time invariant firm heterogeneity and includes the fixed effects for country, firm, industry and time 
to remove the effects of unobserved time-varying shocks.  
 
I have two different estimates for the tax sensitivity of long-term leverage. First I make the regression using 
the actual changes corporate income tax rates, which captures the average change on leverage ratio for every 
one per cent change in tax rates. Additionally, I use dummy variables, which equal one in case of tax cut or 
tax rise and equal 0 if the firm do not face corporate tax change. Thus, the first estimate records the magnitude 
of every cut/increase whereas the second treats every tax change equally in the regression. The estimates 
measure different things as the dummy is aiming to identify whether the firms consider corporate taxation as 
first-order determinant while making the capital structure decisions and adapt the leverage level in line with 
it. The estimate which includes the volume of the change has much greater weight on big-scale tax changes, 
which is why I wanted to include both estimates to the research. It’s hardly justified for example only to assume 
that the tax reduction of 25 percentage points in Austria 1989 to have same kind of effect on leverage like the 
reduction of 0.3% in Finland 1983. 
 
Both of estimates produce significant results. Firms seem to respond to tax rate changes most drastically during 
the year of tax change and one year before.  On average if a member state lowers its tax rate, the firms lower 
their leverage ratios by 0.22% (t-value of 2.57). The mean for long-term leverage in t = 0 is 12.24% and so the 
decrease on leverage is 1.83% from total long-term leverage. The decrease is even bigger in the prior year at -
0.23% (t-value of 2.65), which is about 1.91% from average long-term leverage in year t = +1. There doesn’t 
seem to be noteworthy reversal effect in the following years, indicating that the decrease in leverage is 
permanent.  The estimates, which take the level of tax rate change produce also significant results and are quite 
in line with the dummy-estimations. The estimates from the regression with tax change volumes are more 
moderate compared to the dummy estimates. If a country changes its tax rate one per cent, it lowers the long-
term leverage for mediocre firm by -0.02%. Although the estimates are slightly lower, they are additionally 
more precise and the significance level of the observations are about the same. 
 
It’s important to notice that the tax sensitivity of long-term debt seems to be asymmetric as the regression fails 
to identify any significant increases in leverage ratios in occasion of tax rise. Tax increases do not deliver any 
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results at the significance level of 0.05. To further investigate if there is any responsiveness to tax changes, I 
make conditional estimates to different groups.  
 
4.2 Robustness test: financial distress  
The trade-off theory suggests that corporations with significant bankruptcy costs should not respond to tax 
increases equally intensely as stable companies since the stressed companies have much higher marginal costs 
to increase debt. To test this prediction, I use Altman’s Z-score as a proxy of distress costs. First I divide the 
sample into two groups; first group consists from the top quartile of Z-score values and the other from the 
bottom quarter of the observations (each group covers 21852 observations). After the partition, I examine, 
whether there are differences between the groups and their responsiveness to the tax raises using the same diff-
in-diff method as earlier. The Z-score is a time-variable and it changes annually for the firm when there’s data 
available. If any component of the Z-score is missing, the corporation is left out from the test. 
 
The results are quite dull. The only result with any significance is the lagged after tax impact after tax increase. 
The firms with no distress seem to increase their long-term leverage by 0.2943%, but the result is significant 
at significance level of 0.1. The distressed firms do not respond to any changes.  
 
4.3 Robustness test: multinational companies 
Most European public companies are multinational. This research is based on the assumption of firms paying 
their taxes to their home country. If the firm has international business this might not be the case as the firm 
may home part of its income into other countries with lighter taxation. This signifies that firms with high 
domestic sales tend to respond more sensitively to the corporate tax change of their home country. The 
regression thus may underestimate the responsiveness of leverage to taxes.  
 
The sensitivity of multinationals depends on, whether the firm have operations outside the home country and 
the location of their HQ. The more operations are distributed to other countries, the less precise the estimation 
of the regression is. To observe the affection of the sales locations, I examine the difference between firms 
with no sales internationally to firms with any foreign sales. The dummy is a time-variable and the possible 
multinationality of a corporation is observed annually so if a corporation expands its sales abroad, it will be 
considered in the regression in the same year.   
 
The item for international sales in Datastream is quite limited and there are about 85740 observations with 
21613 domestic observations and 64127 international observations. In table 3 are the results of the test and the 
estimates for tax cuts and decreases. The results are well in line with the hypothesis, as the difference-in
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difference estimates of tax sensitivity for domestic firms are highly significant. On average the firms with 
international sales doesn’t seem to respond to increases at all, if anything the increases lower the leverage, 
these results are not significant though. In case of tax cut, neither group indicate any sensitivity.  
 
4.4 Robustness test: dividends  
Relatively high personal taxation on equity in respect to debt reduces the impact of tax benefit (DeAngelo, H. 
& Masulis, 1980). Dividends are observed because they are estimators for the equity taxation. Non-dividend 
payers have lower equity taxation than dividend-payers because their investors get equity income solely in the 
form of capital gains. The tax sensitivity of debt should thus be more notable for non-dividend payers. There 
seems to be no sensitivity in either groups. There are 56854 observations of non-dividend payers and 62348 
observations of firms paying dividends. 
 
In table 4 are listed the results between the two groups, first with no dividend payout and the second which 
pays out dividends. There are no significant results in either group.  The reasons behind these zero results 
might be multifaceted. One reason can be that the non-dividend paying group is biased as large share of 
unprofitable firms do not pay out dividends. Other reasons can be that there are no substantial differences 
between equity and debt taxation (which is the case for example in Finland).  
 
4.5 Robustness test: profitability 
I also have two control groups consisting of profitable and loss-making companies. Without profits the interest 
tax shields do not have any value. This means that there should be no responsiveness inside the loss-making 
control group whereas profitable companies are anticipated to react according to the corporate tax changes. In 
total, there are 30988 observations of loss-making firms and 98677 observations of profitable companies. The 
outcome of this test can be found in table 4. The findings are in accordance with the assumption as profitable 
firms are highly sensitive to the tax cuts at the significance level of 0.01. There are also significant results in 
lagged and lead values. 
 
4.6 Analysis on results 
European Union has created a single market to ensure the free flow of goods, services and capital around the 
EU within the member states. This means that there are no significant barriers like tariffs for companies to 
operate in other countries. However, the countries are still responsible for their fiscal policy. This means that 
there are significant differences in corporate taxation. As majority of the public companies have remarkable 
international sales, the tax planning between sovereigns is possible.  
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When comparing the results with the American study, there are a couple of significant differences. The most 
obvious one is that the corporations in European Union responded asymmetrically only to tax cuts, whereas in 
American study the companies responded only to tax increases. Second difference concerns the timing of tax 
changes. In American study the tax rises had an impact on leverage in the following year. In this research the 
timing of the change on leverage varies from a year before the change to a year after.  
 
In addition to the different results also the tax environment between U.S and European Union differs. The state 
tax rate constitutes just a small part of the total corporate taxation in the U.S as the statutory federal corporate 
tax rate is 35%. Few firms pay that much income tax, but even in effective basis state taxes are just 24% of 
total corporate taxes (U.S. Government Accountibility Office, 2013). In U.S., the tax planning between states 
is not so crucial as the changes in state tax do not change the effective tax rate very significantly. In Europe, 
the sovereigns have total control over the corporate taxation. Because of wider “tax scale” there are bigger 
benefits in tax planning inside EU-area than in U.S. where the federal tax creates the biggest part of taxation 
anyway. 
 
In Europe, the free trade combined with independent tax policies in member states has created a platform for 
very concrete tax competition. Value driven public firms do acknowledge the impact of taxation to their cash 
flows and aim to home their income in countries with beneficial taxation. One reason for the asymmetric 
sensitivity of taxation may be caused by the possibility to move income from home country to other countries 
where the concern have sales in. Faccio and Xu (2015) prove that tax changes have decreasing effect on capital 
structure in countries with high use of tax evasion. By contrast, taxes matter progressively more as the evasion 
declines. The same findings are undoubtedly also applicable to other tax planning. In case of tax rise, firms 
might look for other options and rather try to avoid the increased tax obligations by transferring their taxable 
income to other countries (e.g. with group contributions and transfer pricing) than adapt their capital structure 
to the new optimal level. This theory is enforced by the fact that in case of tax rise the only groups to respond 
are firms with no international sales and with no financial distress. If there are no sales in foreign countries, 
there are no possibilities for tax planning. If EU home country lowers its corporate tax rate, it increases the 
after-tax profits and makes it more attractive to firms to home their income to home country and adjust their 
capital structure according to it. In further research, the relation between transfer pricing and capital structure 
decisions in home country would be an interesting issue to investigate.  
 
Binsbergen & Al. have proved that that the cost of being overlevered is asymmetrically higher than the cost of 
being underlevered and that expected default costs constitute only half of the total ex ante costs of debt. 
Another possible reason for the opposite sensitivity can simply be that European firms tend to be more risk 
averse and are reluctant to increase the leverage along with taxes and the rises of leverage ratios are mainly 
made to finance new investments.  
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The timing of firms’ capital structure transition varied from t = +1, 0, -1, when the tax change is timed at the 
start of t = 0. This is not unprecedented as to lower leverage ratios firms can use internal financing, issue new 
equity or cut back borrowing. Issuance of new equity costs firms the most as it has the biggest costs of 
asymmetric information. Loans from financial institutions are usually fixed and it is rarely possible to cut back 
borrowing suddenly without large costs, if the firm wants to lower its leverage. Firms can adapt to the tax 
changes step by step just by paying the debt capital and not issuing new debt. Because in many cases a long-
term loan is permanent to be paid in many years or even decades, lowering leverage that way may take some 
time. The other low cost way to transform capital structure is to retain earnings from profits which increases 
the amount of equity. It is often difficult to change the actual payout ratio as it has negative impact on the 
market value of the firm even if the increased retained earnings would enlarge the equity and balances total 
capital in case of cutting down on leverage. These assumptions are in line with the aforementioned pecking 
order theory.  
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5. Conclusion 
 
All European countries allow firms to deduct their interest payments from corporate income taxes. Although 
the theoretical basis of the tax shields has long been known there are little empirical evidence of European 
companies’ responsiveness to corporate tax changes. This paper identifies that tax cuts have significant impact 
to firms’ long-term leverage. The results are asymmetric as corporations do not respond to the corporate tax 
increases. The outcome from full sample is further observed by four different control groups to robust the 
findings. 
 
The tax responsiveness of the firms is not in line with the hypothesis as the trade-off theory suggests the 
sensitivity to be symmetric between tax cuts and increases. There is no watertight theoretical explanation to 
this one-sided behavior, as firms are willing to decrease their leverage but not to increase borrowing when the 
value of debt changes.  
 
One reason that could explain the unbalanced behavior, is the fragmentation of firms’ operations across 
European territory as majority of public firms have sales in more than one country. The European countries 
decide independently on their fiscal policies which have created concrete tax competition. In case of tax rise 
it possible that firms try to avoid the increased liability by tax planning rather than adapting their capital 
structure. Another reason might be caused by the larger costs of overlevering compared to costs of 
underlevering. European companies might be risk averse in respect to tax increases and raise their leverage 
only to fund new investments.  
 
One notable finding is that firms lowered their leverage in a few years. Lowering leverage is possible by cutting 
back borrowing, by issuing equity or by retaining earnings. Cutting back borrowing promptly may have big 
costs as the loan contracts are usually agreed to be fixed for a long time. Issuing new equity has also big costs 
to firm value and firms are usually reluctant to cut back dividend payout as it has a negative effect on their 
market value. Firms may lower their leverage over few years since the cheapest option to decrease leverage 
ratio is by retaining earnings and cutting back net borrowing along with fixed payment schedules. 
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Appendix 
Appendix A. List of member countries’ corporate tax increases 
This table lists all corporate tax increases over the years 1980-2016. The tax rates add up the nominal 
corporate tax by the central government with possible sub-central government corporate income tax rates 
used for example in Germany, Italy and Portugal. To identify these changes for tax rates I use data from 
OECD’s database (http://stats.oecd.org) and from Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/).  
 
                No. of  affected  
Country Year             sample firms  
Greece 2015 Increase of 3,0 % from 26,0 % to 29,0 % 321 
Luxembourg 2013 Increase of 0,4 % from 28,8 % to 29,2 % 6 
France 2013 Increase of 1,9 % from 36,1 % to 38,0 % 1105 
Cyprus 2013 Increase of 2,5 % from 10,0 % to 12,5 % 68 
Slovakia 2013 Increase of 4,0 % from 19,0 % to 23,0 % 17 
Greece 2013 Increase of 6,0 % from 20,0 % to 26,0 % 321 
Portugal 2012 Increase of 3,0 % from 28,5 % to 31,5 % 86 
Luxembourg 2011 Increase of 0,2 % from 28,6 % to 28,8 % 6 
France 2011 Increase of 1,7 % from 34,4 % to 36,1 % 1105 
Portugal 2011 Increase of 2,0 % from 26,5 % to 28,5 % 86 
Lithuania 2009 Increase of 5,0 % from 15,0 % to 20,0 % 28 
Hungary 2007 Increase of 2,7 % from 17,3 % to 20,0 % 38 
Hungary 2006 Increase of 1,3 % from 16,0 % to 17,3 % 38 
Croatia 2003 Increase of 0,3 % from 20,0 % to 20,3 % 42 
Germany 2003 Increase of 1,3 % from 38,9 % to 40,2 % 1021 
Finland 2000 Increase of 1,0 % from 28,0 % to 29,0 % 185 
Cyprus 2000 Increase of 4,0 % from 25,0 % to 29,0 % 68 
Greece 1998 Increase of 5,0 % from 35,0 % to 40,0 % 321 
Bulgaria  1997 Increase of 0,2 % from 40,0 % to 40,2 % 54 
Germany 1997 Increase of 0,9 % from 55,9 % to 56,8 % 1021 
France 1997 Increase of 5,0 % from 36,7 % to 41,7 % 1105 
Germany 1996 Increase of 0,8 % from 55,1 % to 55,9 % 1021 
Finland 1996 Increase of 3,0 % from 25,0 % to 28,0 % 185 
Germany 1995 Increase of 2,9 % from 52,2 % to 55,1 % 1021 
France 1995 Increase of 3,3 % from 33,3 % to 36,7 % 1105 
Italy 1994 Increase of 1,0 % from 52,2 % to 53,2 % 365 
Austria  1994 Increase of 4,0 % from 30,0 % to 34,0 % 112 
Belgium 1993 Increase of 1,2 % from 39,0 % to 40,2 % 145 
Germany 1992 Increase of 1,9 % from 56,3 % to 58,2 % 1021 
Italy 1992 Increase of 4,4 % from 47,8 % to 52,2 % 365 
Italy 1991 Increase of 1,4 % from 46,4 % to 47,8 % 365 
Germany 1991 Increase of 1,7 % from 54,5 % to 56,3 % 1021 
Finland 1989 Increase of 1,0 % from 51,5 % to 52,5 % 185 
Sweden 1989 Increase of 3,5 % from 56,6 % to 60,1 % 577 
Greece 1985 Increase of 4,0 % from 45,0 % to 49,0 % 321 
Denmark 1985 Increase of 10,0 % from 40,0 % to 50,0 % 189 
Finland 1984 Increase of 0,3 % from 61,5 % to 61,8 % 185 
Spain 1984 Increase of 2,0 % from 33,0 % to 35,0 % 179 
Sweden 1983 Increase of 0,3 % from 57,8 % to 58,1 % 577 
Portugal 1983 Increase of 4,4 % from 50,7 % to 55,1 % 86 
Italy 1983 Increase of 5,1 % from 41,3 % to 46,4 % 365 
Finland 1982 Increase of 0,3 % from 61,5 % to 61,8 % 185 
Portugal 1982 Increase of 1,8 % from 49,0 % to 50,7 % 86 
Ireland 1982 Increase of 5,0 % from 45,0 % to 50,0 % 88 
Italy 1982 Increase of 5,1 % from 36,3 % to 41,3 % 365 
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Appendix B. List of member countries’ corporate tax decreases 
This table lists all corporate tax cuts over the years 1980-2016. The tax rates add up the nominal corporate 
tax by the central government with possible sub-central government corporate income tax rates used for 
example in Germany, Italy and Portugal. To identify these changes for tax rates I use data from OECD’s 
database (http://stats.oecd.org) and from Trading Economics (http://www.tradingeconomics.com/). There 
was one tax cut at the turn of the millennium, which differed between the two data sources. In case of 
contradiction, I used the data from OECD.  
 
                No. of  affected  
Country Year             sample firms  
France 2016 Reduction of -3,6 %  38,0 %  34,4 % 1105 
Spain 2016 Reduction of -3,0 %  28,0 %  25,0 % 179 
Denmark 2016 Reduction of -1,5 %  23,5 %  22,0 % 189 
Spain 2015 Reduction of -2,0 %  30,0 %  28,0 % 179 
Denmark 2015 Reduction of -1,0 %  24,5 %  23,5 % 189 
Estonia 2015 Reduction of -1,0 %  21,0 %  20,0 % 52 
United Kingdom 2015 Reduction of -1,0 %  21,0 %  20,0 % 3379 
Portugal 2014 Reduction of -2,0 %  31,5 %  29,5 % 86 
Finland 2014 Reduction of -4,5 %  24,5 %  20,0 % 185 
United Kingdom 2014 Reduction of -2,0 %  23,0 %  21,0 % 3379 
Slovakia 2014 Reduction of -1,0 %  23,0 %  22,0 % 17 
Denmark 2014 Reduction of -0,5 %  25,0 %  24,5 % 189 
Sweden 2013 Reduction of -4,3 %  26,3 %  22,0 % 577 
Slovenia 2013 Reduction of -3,0 %  20,0 %  17,0 % 18 
United Kingdom 2013 Reduction of -1,0 %  24,0 %  23,0 % 3379 
United Kingdom 2012 Reduction of -2,0 %  26,0 %  24,0 % 3379 
Finland 2012 Reduction of -1,5 %  26,0 %  24,5 % 185 
Italy 2012 Reduction of -0,1 %  31,4 %  31,3 % 365 
Greece 2011 Reduction of -4,0 %  24,0 %  20,0 % 321 
United Kingdom 2011 Reduction of -2,0 %  28,0 %  26,0 % 3379 
Netherlands 2011 Reduction of -0,5 %  25,5 %  25,0 % 261 
Lithuania 2010 Reduction of -5,0 %  20,0 %  15,0 % 28 
Czech Republic 2010 Reduction of -1,0 %  20,0 %  19,0 % 54 
Greece 2010 Reduction of -1,0 %  25,0 %  24,0 % 321 
Hungary 2010 Reduction of -1,0 %  20,0 %  19,0 % 38 
Slovenia 2010 Reduction of -1,0 %  21,0 %  20,0 % 18 
Sweden 2009 Reduction of -1,7 %  28,0 %  26,3 % 577 
Luxembourg 2009 Reduction of -1,0 %  29,6 %  28,6 % 6 
Slovenia 2009 Reduction of -1,0 %  22,0 %  21,0 % 18 
Czech Republic 2009 Reduction of -1,0 %  21,0 %  20,0 % 54 
Germany 2008 Reduction of -8,7 %  38,9 %  30,2 % 1021 
Italy 2008 Reduction of -5,9 %  37,3 %  31,4 % 365 
Czech Republic 2008 Reduction of -3,0 %  24,0 %  21,0 % 54 
Spain 2008 Reduction of -2,5 %  32,5 %  30,0 % 179 
United Kingdom 2008 Reduction of -2,0 %  30,0 %  28,0 % 3379 
Estonia 2008 Reduction of -1,0 %  22,0 %  21,0 % 52 
Slovenia 2008 Reduction of -1,0 %  23,0 %  22,0 % 18 
Croatia 2008 Reduction of -0,3 %  20,3 %  20,0 % 42 
Bulgaria  2007 Reduction of -5,0 %  15,0 %  10,0 % 54 
Netherlands 2007 Reduction of -4,1 %  29,6 %  25,5 % 261 
Greece 2007 Reduction of -4,0 %  29,0 %  25,0 % 321 
Denmark 2007 Reduction of -3,0 %  28,0 %  25,0 % 189 
Spain 2007 Reduction of -2,5 %  35,0 %  32,5 % 179 
Slovenia 2007 Reduction of -2,0 %  25,0 %  23,0 % 18 
Estonia 2007 Reduction of -1,0 %  23,0 %  22,0 % 52 
Portugal 2007 Reduction of -1,0 %  27,5 %  26,5 % 86 
Greece 2006 Reduction of -3,0 %  32,0 %  29,0 % 321 
Czech Republic 2006 Reduction of -2,0 %  26,0 %  24,0 % 54 
Netherlands 2006 Reduction of -1,9 %  31,5 %  29,6 % 261 
Estonia 2006 Reduction of -1,0 %  24,0 %  23,0 % 52 
Luxembourg 2006 Reduction of -0,8 %  30,4 %  29,6 % 6 
France 2006 Reduction of -0,5 %  35,0 %  34,4 % 1105 
Austria  2005 Reduction of -9,0 %  34,0 %  25,0 % 112 
Romania 2005 Reduction of -9,0 %  25,0 %  16,0 % 82 
Cyprus 2005 Reduction of -5,0 %  15,0 %  10,0 % 68 
Bulgaria  2005 Reduction of -4,5 %  19,5 %  15,0 % 54 
Finland 2005 Reduction of -3,0 %  29,0 %  26,0 % 185 
Greece 2005 Reduction of -3,0 %  35,0 %  32,0 % 321 
Netherlands 2005 Reduction of -3,0 %  34,5 %  31,5 % 261 
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Czech Republic 2005 Reduction of -2,0 %  28,0 %  26,0 % 54 
Estonia 2005 Reduction of -2,0 %  26,0 %  24,0 % 52 
Denmark 2005 Reduction of -2,0 %  30,0 %  28,0 % 189 
France 2005 Reduction of -0,5 %  35,4 %  35,0 % 1105 
Poland 2004 Reduction of -8,0 %  27,0 %  19,0 % 401 
Slovakia 2004 Reduction of -6,0 %  25,0 %  19,0 % 17 
Portugal 2004 Reduction of -5,5 %  33,0 %  27,5 % 86 
Bulgaria  2004 Reduction of -4,0 %  23,5 %  19,5 % 54 
Czech Republic 2004 Reduction of -3,0 %  31,0 %  28,0 % 54 
Hungary 2004 Reduction of -2,0 %  18,0 %  16,0 % 38 
Germany 2004 Reduction of -1,3 %  40,2 %  38,9 % 1021 
Italy 2004 Reduction of -1,0 %  38,3 %  37,3 % 365 
Cyprus 2003 Reduction of -13,0 %  28,0 %  15,0 % 68 
Belgium 2003 Reduction of -6,2 %  40,2 %  34,0 % 145 
Ireland 2003 Reduction of -3,5 %  16,0 %  12,5 % 88 
Italy 2003 Reduction of -2,0 %  40,3 %  38,3 % 365 
Poland 2003 Reduction of -1,0 %  28,0 %  27,0 % 401 
Latvia 2002 Reduction of -10,0 %  25,0 %  15,0 % 25 
Luxembourg 2002 Reduction of -7,1 %  37,5 %  30,4 % 6 
Bulgaria  2002 Reduction of -4,5 %  28,0 %  23,5 % 54 
Ireland 2002 Reduction of -4,0 %  20,0 %  16,0 % 88 
Slovakia 2002 Reduction of -4,0 %  29,0 %  25,0 % 17 
Greece 2002 Reduction of -2,5 %  37,5 %  35,0 % 321 
Portugal 2002 Reduction of -2,2 %  35,2 %  33,0 % 86 
France 2002 Reduction of -1,0 %  36,4 %  35,4 % 1105 
Netherlands 2002 Reduction of -0,5 %  35,0 %  34,5 % 261 
Germany 2002 Reduction of 0,0 %  38,9 %  38,9 % 1021 
Germany 2001 Reduction of -13,1 %  52,0 %  38,9 % 1021 
Bulgaria  2001 Reduction of -4,5 %  32,5 %  28,0 % 54 
Ireland 2001 Reduction of -4,0 %  24,0 %  20,0 % 88 
Greece 2001 Reduction of -2,5 %  40,0 %  37,5 % 321 
Denmark 2001 Reduction of -2,0 %  32,0 %  30,0 % 189 
Poland 2001 Reduction of -2,0 %  30,0 %  28,0 % 401 
France 2001 Reduction of -1,3 %  37,8 %  36,4 % 1105 
Cyprus 2001 Reduction of -1,0 %  29,0 %  28,0 % 68 
Italy 2001 Reduction of -1,0 %  41,3 %  40,3 % 365 
Romania 2000 Reduction of -13,0 %  38,0 %  25,0 % 82 
Slovakia 2000 Reduction of -11,0 %  40,0 %  29,0 % 17 
Latvia 2000 Reduction of -4,0 %  29,0 %  25,0 % 25 
Ireland 2000 Reduction of -4,0 %  28,0 %  24,0 % 88 
Poland 2000 Reduction of -4,0 %  34,0 %  30,0 % 401 
Czech Republic 2000 Reduction of -4,0 %  35,0 %  31,0 % 54 
France 2000 Reduction of -2,2 %  40,0 %  37,8 % 1105 
Portugal 2000 Reduction of -2,2 %  37,4 %  35,2 % 86 
Bulgaria  2000 Reduction of -1,8 %  34,3 %  32,5 % 54 
Germany 1999 Reduction of -4,0 %  56,0 %  52,0 % 1021 
Ireland 1999 Reduction of -4,0 %  32,0 %  28,0 % 88 
Bulgaria  1999 Reduction of -2,7 %  37,0 %  34,3 % 54 
Denmark 1999 Reduction of -2,0 %  34,0 %  32,0 % 189 
Poland 1999 Reduction of -2,0 %  36,0 %  34,0 % 401 
France 1999 Reduction of -1,7 %  41,7 %  40,0 % 1105 
United Kingdom 1999 Reduction of -1,0 %  31,0 %  30,0 % 3379 
Italy 1998 Reduction of -12,0 %  53,2 %  41,3 % 365 
Czech Republic 1998 Reduction of -4,0 %  39,0 %  35,0 % 54 
Ireland 1998 Reduction of -4,0 %  36,0 %  32,0 % 88 
Bulgaria  1998 Reduction of -3,2 %  40,2 %  37,0 % 54 
Poland 1998 Reduction of -2,0 %  38,0 %  36,0 % 401 
Germany 1998 Reduction of -0,8 %  56,8 %  56,0 % 1021 
Portugal 1997 Reduction of -2,2 %  39,6 %  37,4 % 86 
Poland 1997 Reduction of -2,0 %  40,0 %  38,0 % 401 
United Kingdom 1997 Reduction of -2,0 %  33,0 %  31,0 % 3379 
Ireland 1996 Reduction of -2,0 %  38,0 %  36,0 % 88 
Czech Republic 1996 Reduction of -2,0 %  41,0 %  39,0 % 54 
Hungary 1995 Reduction of -18,0 %  36,0 %  18,0 % 38 
Ireland 1995 Reduction of -2,0 %  40,0 %  38,0 % 88 
Czech Republic 1995 Reduction of -1,0 %  42,0 %  41,0 % 54 
Slovakia 1994 Reduction of -5,0 %  45,0 %  40,0 % 17 
Germany 1994 Reduction of -4,3 %  56,5 %  52,2 % 1021 
Hungary 1994 Reduction of -4,0 %  40,0 %  36,0 % 38 
Czech Republic 1994 Reduction of -3,0 %  45,0 %  42,0 % 54 
Sweden 1994 Reduction of -2,0 %  30,0 %  28,0 % 577 
Finland 1993 Reduction of -14,0 %  39,0 %  25,0 % 185 
Greece 1993 Reduction of -5,5 %  40,5 %  35,0 % 321 
Germany 1993 Reduction of -1,6 %  58,2 %  56,5 % 1021 
France 1993 Reduction of -0,7 %  34,0 %  33,3 % 1105 
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France 1992 Reduction of -8,0 %  42,0 %  34,0 % 1105 
Greece 1992 Reduction of -5,5 %  46,0 %  40,5 % 321 
Denmark 1992 Reduction of -4,0 %  38,0 %  34,0 % 189 
Finland 1992 Reduction of -3,0 %  42,0 %  39,0 % 185 
Sweden 1991 Reduction of -23,0 %  53,0 %  30,0 % 577 
Ireland 1991 Reduction of -3,0 %  43,0 %  40,0 % 88 
Finland 1991 Reduction of -2,5 %  44,5 %  42,0 % 185 
Denmark 1991 Reduction of -2,0 %  40,0 %  38,0 % 189 
Belgium 1991 Reduction of -2,0 %  41,0 %  39,0 % 145 
United Kingdom 1991 Reduction of -1,0 %  34,0 %  33,0 % 3379 
Portugal 1991 Reduction of -0,5 %  40,2 %  39,6 % 86 
Denmark 1990 Reduction of -10,0 %  50,0 %  40,0 % 189 
Hungary 1990 Reduction of -10,0 %  50,0 %  40,0 % 38 
Finland 1990 Reduction of -8,0 %  52,5 %  44,5 % 185 
Sweden 1990 Reduction of -7,1 %  60,1 %  53,0 % 577 
Germany 1990 Reduction of -5,5 %  60,0 %  54,5 % 1021 
Belgium 1990 Reduction of -2,0 %  43,0 %  41,0 % 145 
United Kingdom 1990 Reduction of -1,0 %  35,0 %  34,0 % 3379 
Austria  1989 Reduction of -25,0 %  55,0 %  30,0 % 112 
Portugal 1989 Reduction of -7,9 %  48,1 %  40,2 % 86 
Netherlands 1989 Reduction of -7,0 %  42,0 %  35,0 % 261 
Ireland 1989 Reduction of -4,0 %  47,0 %  43,0 % 88 
Greece 1989 Reduction of -3,0 %  49,0 %  46,0 % 321 
France 1988 Reduction of -3,0 %  45,0 %  42,0 % 1105 
Ireland 1988 Reduction of -3,0 %  50,0 %  47,0 % 88 
Portugal 1987 Reduction of -2,2 %  50,3 %  48,1 % 86 
Belgium 1987 Reduction of -2,0 %  45,0 %  43,0 % 145 
Finland 1986 Reduction of -10,3 %  61,8 %  51,5 % 185 
United Kingdom 1986 Reduction of -5,0 %  40,0 %  35,0 % 3379 
France 1986 Reduction of -5,0 %  50,0 %  45,0 % 1105 
Portugal 1986 Reduction of -4,8 %  55,1 %  50,3 % 86 
Netherlands 1986 Reduction of -1,0 %  43,0 %  42,0 % 261 
United Kingdom 1985 Reduction of -5,0 %  45,0 %  40,0 % 3379 
Netherlands 1984 Reduction of -5,0 %  48,0 %  43,0 % 261 
United Kingdom 1984 Reduction of -5,0 %  50,0 %  45,0 % 3379 
Sweden 1984 Reduction of -1,5 %  58,1 %  56,6 % 577 
Belgium 1983 Reduction of -3,0 %  48,0 %  45,0 % 145 
United Kingdom 1983 Reduction of -2,0 %  52,0 %  50,0 % 3379 
Finland 1983 Reduction of -0,3 %   61,8 %   61,5 % 185 
*Latvia's change of corporate tax rate was 4 percentage point according to OECD, Trading Economics recorded a change of 5 
percentage points.  
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Appendix C. List of Datastream items used in the research 
	
	
Time variables  
  
Dependant Variables  
  
- Total Liabilities (WS) WC03351 
- Long-term book leverage (WC03251) 
  
Control variables (Datastream item) 
  
- Net Tangible Assets (NTA) 
- Price-to-Book Value (PTBV) 
- Return on Assets (WC08326) 
- Total Assets (U.s.$) (WC07230) 
- Total Assets (WC02999) 
- Dividend Payout % Earnings (WC08256) 
- International Sales (WC07101) 
  
Variables used for Altman's Z-score 
  
- Earnings Before Interest and Taxes (WC18191) 
- Retained Earnings (WC03495) 
- Working Capital (WC03151) 
- Total Assets (WS) (Key item) WC02999 
- Market Value (MSMV) 
- Net Sales or Revenues WC01001 
  
Static Variables 
- Industry Identifier: Sic Code (WC07021) 
- Country of Security (IBCTRY) 
- Code of Security - Datastream (DSCD) 
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Figure 1. The theoretical basis for trade-off theory and empirical identification 
The first figure visualizes the standard argument of trade-off theory. Companies should increase their 
leverage until the marginal cost of financial distress equals the marginal benefit of interest tax shield. The 
value of interest tax shields depends on the corporate tax rate (Tc), personal tax rate on income from debt 
(Ti), the personal tax rate on income from equity (Te) and the amount of debt. The tax benefit for the firm 
equals [(1-Ti)-(1-Tc)(1-Te)]*D. Financial distress costs grow by the formula a + bD + cD2. Figures 1b, 1c and 
1d illustrate the challenges of empirical identification of marginal cost and marginal benefit. In ideal 
situation (1b), the marginal cost and benefit are known. Different tax rates (MB1 , MB2 , MB3 ,…, MBn ) 
are randomly assigned to firms and the resulting debt choices (D1 , D2 , D3 ,…, Dn ) are recorded. The 
random assignment ensures that differences in debt levels cannot be the result of unobserved heterogeneity 
across firms. Figure 1c visualize the assumptions made for observational data. When comparing two firms 
which have different effective tax rates they must share the same marginal cost MCi = MCj. The 
identification challenge (visualized in 1d) is that companies can have different debt levels even without 
marginal benefits as long as they have different marginal costs which violates the identifying assumption 
(Heider & Ljungqvist 2012). 
 
Figure 1a: Traditional view of trade of theory Figure 1b: The ideal experiment 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1c Identifiying assumption   Figure 1d : Identification challenge 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
The sample consists of 424427 firm-years inside European Union area. All financials, utilities and public 
sector companies are omitted from the final sample. The summary table reports the statistics for all the 
dependent and control variables used in the research.  The 0.5% of top and bottom observations are cut out 
from return on assets, total assets, net tangible assets, price-to-book ratio and Z-score. 
	
	
Quartiles
Observations mean s.d. 1st Qu. Median 3rd Qu.
Firm Leverage
Long-term debt / Total assets 138649 12.24 14.57179 0.41 7.49 18.75
Total Liabilities / Total assets 135153 53.14 24.25735 38.48 55.38 69.52
Long-term debt ($) 141385 347500 2273517 156 6394 59100
Country-Specific Characteristics
GDP-growth 368537 1.83 2.386259 0.800 2.00 3.00
Unemployment 337870 8.38 3.271422 6.10 8.10 10.00
Firm-specific factors
Return on assets 127194 2.79 16.19313 0.48 4.54 8.47
Total Assets ($) 140707 2557000 39050429 25510 572900 4949000000
Net tangible assets ($) 217086 438100 3025304 9843 39390 158500
Price-to-book ratio 181734 2.4 4.55 0.75 1.48 2.74
Z-score 87407 0.90 3.27 0.70 1.50 2.30
All firm-years (N = 424427)
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Table 2. Effect of tax change on leverage 
I estimate standard regression to test the sensitivity of the leverage in response to changes. The sample 
excludes all the financials, public-sector entities and utilities. All firms with negative equity are deleted from 
the regression as they are in serious distress. The results in the first columns are mainly positive because they 
are estimated with the positive (tax rise) and negative (tax cut) coefficients. In the second columns, the 
dummy variable is valued at 1 in case of tax change and otherwise 0. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. 
 
  
	
Depending variable: Change in long-term book leverage
Std. Std.
Estimate error Estimate error
Tax	cuts
Tax cut in t = -2 0.003658 0.008264 0.05826 0.09983
Tax cut in t = -1 0.010800 0.007902 -0.005254 0.092934
Tax cut in t = 0 0.020052 0.007479 ** -0.224047 0.087181 **
Tax cut in t = +1 0.015073 0.007993 . -0.232892 0.088045 **
Tax cut in t = +2 0.002108 0.002121 -0.021789 0.024517
Tax rises
Tax rise in t = -2 0.007474 0.083900 -0.147661 0.239044
Tax rise in t = -1 0.0318771 0.0783780 -0.3410792 0.2263581
Tax rise in t = 0 -0.066467 0.074527 -0.362832 0.212051
Tax rise in t = +1 -0.059271 0.075624 0.021309 0.215844
Tax rise in t = +2 0.044985 0.078186 0.185216 0.223441
Control variables at t = 0
ROA -0.2332341 0.1036613 * -0.247311 0.101537 *
Firm size 5.1087111 0.0740003 *** 5.030415 0.072534 ***
Tangibility -1.6513824 0.0257731 *** -1.599082 0.025038 ***
PBV 0.1646449 0.0090500 *** 0.159895 0.008945 ***
Default spread -0.2766011 0.0226986 *** -0.274647 0.022488 ***
GDP Growth -0.1375639 0.0229293 *** -0.135817 0.022381 ***
Unemployment -0.0573793 0.0185048 ** -0.048298 0.016953 **
Diagnostics
Full model R2 0.63 0.64
Observations 52916 52916
Significance codes *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05, . = 0.1
Change in tax: -1/+1% (1)
Dummy: 1 if tax
cut or rise (2)
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Table 3. Financial distress and location of sales  
Firms with financial distress have higher margin costs to increase leverage compared to stable firms. In the  
first column is the quartile of observations with highest Z-scores and in the second column there’s the 
quartile with lowest Z-scores. The sample is winsorized 0.5% from each tail. In third and fourth columns, I 
compare the observations with international sales to observations without international sales. If the 
international sales value is 0 the dummy is also 0 otherwise, it is 1. The unit of analysis is a firm-year. 
 
 
  
No financial Financial No 
distress distress international International 
(top quartile) (bottom quartile) sales sales
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change of 1% in tax increase at t= -1 in (%) 2.943e-01 . 0.3197680 2.916e-01 . 2.364e-02
1.625e-01 0.2593030 1.656e-01 1.095e-01
Change of -1% in tax cut at t= -1 in (%) 0.0012405 0.0017952 5.086e-03 ** -2.483e.04
0.0025023 0.003398 1.926e-03 9.426e-04
Change of 1% in tax increase at t= 0 in (%) 0.1097445 0.2580814 -1.568e-01 7.241e-02
0.1366905 0.2417122 2.268e-01 7.968e-02
Change of -1% in tax cut at t= 0 in (%) 0.0005634 0.001828 6.489e-03 *** 0.0032927 **
0.0022311 0.002954 1.720e-03 0.0011642
Change of 1% in tax increase at t= +1 in (%) 0.0810343 -0.901111 0.125382 5.558e-02
0.1524385 0.761329 0.507853 8.153e-02
Change of -1% in tax cut at t= +1 in (%) 0.0003442 0.001098 0.003137  . 0.0013219
0.0024890 0.002932 0.001684 0.0008857
Control variables at t = 0
Return on assets -0.0618120 *** -0.0110369 -1.192e+00 *** -4.499e-02 ***
0.0090005 0.0083338 2.384e-01 6.502e-03
Firm size 4.5412776 *** 3.1973931 *** 2.625e+00 *** 4.660355 ***
0.1685278 0.2523094 1.494e-01 0.142251
Tangibilty -2.0785855 *** -1.2396252 *** -1.102e-06 *** -1.249 ***
0.0699037 0.0641765 2.634e-07 2.7021e-01
Price to book 0.0009717 0.0007129 3.902e-02 * 0.194758 ***
0.0008147 0.0017278 1.858e-02 0.017921
Default risk -0.5474039 *** 0.0073448 6.416e-04 -0.605671 ***
0.0872146 0.0099915 7.477e-03 0.069437
GDP growth 0.0117174 -0.0527393 -7.124e-02 -4.7121e-02
0.0473576 0.0984243 7.091e-02 4.8571e-02
Unemployment 0.0678855 . -0.2028537 ** -1.913e-02 -9.025e-03
0.0373766 0.0739189 5.426e-02 3.2576e-02
Diagnostics
Full model R2 0.66 0.64 0.73 0.64
Observations 12598 8470 6143 27287
Firms 1349 990 638 2885
Significance codes *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05, . = 0.1
Depending variable: Change in long-term book leverage
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Table 4. Profitability and dividend payout 
High taxation on equity income reduces the effect of corporate taxation on leverage. To test it, I have dummy 
to separate firms with dividends from non-dividend payers. Non-dividend payers should have lower taxation 
on equity because their equity income is solely distributed in the form of capital gains. The observed tax 
response should thus vary with profits. Columns 3 and 4 shows the effect of profitability to income and 
divide the sample firms according to whether they are profitable or loss-making in year 0. Without profits to 
shield, there are no tax benefit of debt.  The unit of analysis is a firm-year. 
 
 
Non-dividend Dividend Profitable Loss-making
payers payers
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Change of 1% in tax increase at t= -1 in (%) -0.076257 -5.205e-02 2.338e-02 9.037e-02
0.156160 1.053e-01 8.279e-02 2.381e-01
Change of -1% in tax cut at t= -1 in (%) 0.0002976 4.709e-04  1.161e-03 . 3.333e-03
0.0021563 7.958e-04 7.346e-04 4.975e-03
Change of 1% in tax increase at t= 0 in (%) -0.072076 -0.37887 -0.139597 . 0.0840119
0.147834 0.24927 0.076917 0.2117488
Change of -1% in tax cut at t= 0 in (%) 0.001515 0.0013226 0.0021264 ** 5.329e-03
0.001930 0.0007188 0.0006798 4.533e-03
Change of 1% in tax increase at t= +1 in (%) 0.001123 -0.123948 -0.046807 -0.295019
0.001957 0.102479 0.082610 0.202442
Change of -1% in tax cut at t= +1 in (%) -0.297431 0.0003157 1.844e-03 * 2.925e-03
0.147681 0.0007702 7.441e-04 4.332e-03
Control variables at t = 0
Return on assets -0.009847 * 8.155275 -0.1071676 ** -0.0009223
0.004614 7.278978 0.0068974 0.0086008
Firm size 4.228332 *** 7.05956 *** 6.4434753 *** 3.1674262 ***
0.163029 0.14158 0.0883096 0.2257904
Tangibilty -1.401145 *** -3.15700 *** -2.4122715 *** -1.1990376 ***
0.047152 0.06661 0.0374028 0.0591877
Price to book 0.169673 * 0.29632 *** 0.2224731 0.1242027 ***
0.017484 0.01993 0.0123259 0.0221504
Default spread -0.136162 ** -2.69455 *** -0.9285927 *** -0.1590969 **
0.049361 0.12982 0.0563167 0.0617174
GDP growth -0.132872 ** -0.03655 *** -0.2003392 *** -0.0593336
0.046569 0.03666 0.0242384 0.0726078
Unemployment 0.022508 0.00762 ** -0.0323339 . 0.0264593
0.039478 0.02704 0.0190081 0.0613989
Diagnostics
Full model R2 0.63 0.72 0.68 0.65
Observations 20845 26537 49160 13865
Firms 2723 2843 4244 1789
Significance codes *** = 0.001, ** = 0.01, * = 0.05, . = 0.1
Depending variable: Change in long-term book leverage
